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Abstract
Recently, the concept on ‘forgeable quantum messages’ in arbitrated quantum signature schemes
was introduced by T. Kim et al. [Phys. Scr., 90, 025101 (2015)], and it has been shown that there
always exists such a forgeable quantum message for every known arbitrated quantum signature
scheme with four quantum encryption operators and the specific two rotation operators. We
first extend the result to the case of any two unitary rotation operators, and then consider the
forgeable quantum messages in the schemes with four quantum encryption operators and three
or more rotation operators. We here present a necessary and sufficient condition for existence of
a forgeable quantum message, and moreover, by employing the condition, show that there exists
an arbitrated quantum signature scheme which contains no forgeable quantum message-signature
pairs.
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I. INTRODUCTION
It has been known that quantum cryptography provides us with unconditional security
in key distribution. In order to extend the range of quantum cryptographic primitives,
other quantum-mechanics-based cryptographic schemes such as signature schemes should
be studied and developed.
Even though quantum mechanics can help in digitally signing classical messages [1], and
its techniques have been developed [2, 3], it unfortunately turns out that it is not possible
to digitally sign quantum messages [4]. On the other hand, it has been shown that it could
be possible to quantumly sign quantum messages with the assistance of an arbitrator, which
is called the arbitrated quantum signature (AQS) [5–16].
However, it has been also shown that the AQS schemes can be vulnerable to receiver’s
forgery attacks [9, 10, 12, 14–16]. In particular, according to the result in Ref. [16], for
almost all known AQS schemes, there are forgeable quantum message-signature pairs which
can be forged by the receiver, although all other pairs cannot be forged. Furthermore, there
has not yet been an analytical proof that there exists an AQS scheme without any forgeable
quantum message-signature pairs.
In this paper, we first show that there is always a forgeable quantum message-signature
pair in an AQS scheme with two quantum random rotations, and present a necessary and
sufficient condition for a given AQS scheme with four quantum encryption operators and
three or more quantum random rotations to produce at least one forgeable quantum message.
By using this condition, we analytically prove that there exists an AQS scheme without any
forgeable quantum message-signature pairs.
II. FORGEABLE QUANTUM MESSAGES
Most qubit-based AQS schemes have two quantum signature operators, the random ro-
tation {Rj}j∈Z2 defined by two Pauli operators σx and σz, that is, R0 = σx and R1 = σz,
and the quantum encryption {Ek}k∈Z4 [17] with unitary operator Ek satisfying
1
4
∑
k∈Z4
EkρE
†
k =
1
2
I (1)
2
for any qubit state ρ. It follows that
1
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∑
j∈Z2
∑
k∈Z4
EkRjρR
†
jE
†
k =
1
2
I. (2)
Thus, for a given quantum message |M〉 and a previously shared key (j, k), its signature |S〉
becomes
|S〉 = EkRj |M〉. (3)
Let (|M ′〉, |S ′〉) be the transmitted message-signature pair. Then we say that the signature
is valid if
|M ′〉 ≃ R†jE†k|S ′〉, (4)
where |A〉 ≃ |B〉 if and only if |A〉 equals |B〉 up to global phase. In other words,
|M ′〉 = eiθjkR†jE†k|S ′〉 (5)
for some real number θjk. We note that one can determine with high probability whether
the signature is valid or not, by using the swap test [18] for proper number of copies of the
states.
In addition, we remark that quantum encryptions in all existing AQS schemes can be
essentially reduced to the quantum encryption with four unitary operators
Ek = σkW (6)
for some uniatry operator W , which is called an assistant unitary operator of the AQS
scheme [15], where σ0 = I, σ1 = σx, σ2 = σy and σ3 = σz.
Recently, Kim et al. [16] proposed a new concept, forgeable quantum messages as follows.
For a given AQS scheme with the unitary random rotation {Rj} and quantum encryption
of the form in Eq. (6), there exist a quantum message |M0〉, a non-identity unitary Q and a
unitary U such that
R†jW
†σ†kQσkWRj |M0〉 ≃ U |M0〉 (7)
for all j ∈ Z2 and k ∈ Z4 if and only if the quantum message |M0〉 is said to be forgeable in
the AQS scheme. This implies that the receiver can forge at least one quantum message and
its signature by exploiting a pair of forgery operators Q and U , although all other quantum
message-signature pairs cannot be forged.
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III. MAIN RESULTS
Theorem 1. Assume that an AQS scheme consists of the random rotation {Rj}j∈Z2 defined
by two unitary operators and a quantum encryption {σkW}k∈Z4 with an assistant unitary
operator W . Then there exists at least one forgeable qubit message |M0〉 in the AQS scheme.
Proof. We here take Q = σ1. Then for any unitary W , we note that
R†0W
†σkσ1σkWR0 ≃ R†0W †σ1WR0,
R†1W
†σkσ1σkWR1 ≃ R†1W †σ1WR1 (8)
for all k ∈ Z4, since σ1 ≃ σkσ1σk for all k ∈ Z4. Thus it suffices to show that
R†1W
†σ1WR1|M〉 ≃ R†0W †σ1WR0|M〉 (9)
for some qubit state |M〉.
Since the unitary operator
(
R†0W
†σ1WR0
)† (
R†1W
†σ1WR1
)
(10)
has an eigenstate with a complex eigenvalue of modulus one by the spectral decomposition
theorem, there exists a message |M0〉 such that
(
R†0W
†σ1WR0
)† (
R†1W
†σ1WR1
)
|M0〉 ≃ |M0〉, (11)
that is,
R†1W
†σ1WR1|M0〉 ≃ R†0W †σ1WR0|M0〉. (12)
For example, we assume that an AQS scheme consists of the random rotation {Rj}j∈Z2
defined by two Pauli operators σx and σz and a quantum encryption {σkW}k∈Z4 with an
assistant unitary operator W . Then there exists at least one forgeable qubit message |M0〉
by Theorem 1. It means that there exists at least one forgeable qubit message in most of
the previously known AQS schemes.
We now introduce the following basic property in linear algebra [19] to obtain our main
results.
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Proposition 2. Two r × r matrices A and B have a common eigenvector if and only if
r−1⋂
k,l=1
ker (AkBl −BlAk) 6= {0}, (13)
where, for an r × r matrix C, ker(C) = {x ∈ Cr|Cx = 0} is called the kernel of C.
We remark that ker(C) = {0} if and only if C is invertible, and hence two 2 × 2 ma-
trices A and B have a common eigenvector if and only if ker(AB − BA) 6= {0}, that is,
det (AB − BA) = 0. Since we here deal with only 2 × 2 matrices, we obtain the following
lemma by employing the above remark and Proposition 2.
Lemma 3. Assume that an AQS scheme consists of the random rotation {R˜j}j∈{1,2,3} with
R˜j ∈ {σl : l ∈ Z4} and a quantum encryption {σkW}k∈Z4 with an assistant unitary operator
W , and that there exists a forgeable quantum message, that is, there exist a quantum message
|M0〉, forgery operators Q and U such that
R˜†jW
†σ†kQσkWR˜j|M0〉 ≃ U |M0〉, (14)
where
Q = q0σ0 + iq1σ1 − iq2σ2 + iq3σ3 (15)
for ql ∈ R, q0 ≥ 0 with
∑
l∈Z4
q2l = 1. Then ql = ql′ = 0 for some distinct l and l
′ in Z4.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we may assume that for each j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, R˜j = σj . Then
since
σ†jW
†σ†kQσkWσj|M0〉 ≃ U |M0〉 (16)
for all j ∈ {1, 2, 3} and k ∈ Z4, it follows that
σ†j′W
†σ†k′Q
†σk′Wσj′σ
†
jW
†σ†kQσkWσj |M0〉 ≃ |M0〉 (17)
for all j, j′ ∈ {1, 2, 3} and k, k′ ∈ Z4. In other words, for all j, j′ ∈ {1, 2, 3} and k, k′ ∈ Z4,
all 2× 2 matrices
σ†j′W
†σ†k′Q
†σk′Wσj′σ
†
jW
†σ†kQσkWσj (18)
have a common eigenvector |M0〉. In particular, the two 2× 2 matrices
σ†1W
†σ†0Q
†σ0Wσ1σ
†
1W
†σ†1Qσ1Wσ1 = σ1W
†Q†σ1Qσ1Wσ1
σ†1W
†σ†0Q
†σ0Wσ1σ
†
1W
†σ†2Qσ2Wσ1 = σ1W
†Q†σ2Qσ2Wσ1 (19)
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have a common eigenvector |M0〉. Thus, by Proposition 2,
0 = det
(
σ1W
†Q†σ1Qσ1Q
†σ2Qσ2Wσ1 − σ1W †Q†σ2Qσ2Q†σ1Qσ1Wσ1
)
= q20q
2
1q
2
2 + q
2
0q
2
2q
2
3 + q
2
0q
2
1q
2
3 + q
2
1q
2
2q
2
3. (20)
Hence we obtain that there exist at least two l, l′ in Z4 such that ql = ql′ = 0.
We note that any 2× 2 unitary operator can be expressed as the form of Eq. (15) up to
global phase. Thus we may assume that an assistant unitary operator W is
W = w0σ0 + iw1σ1 − iw2σ2 + iw3σ3, (21)
where wl ∈ R, w0 ≥ 0 and
∑
l∈Z4
w2l = 1. Then for distinct l, m, n ∈ {1, 2, 3}, let
αl ≡ w20 + w2l −
1
2
=
1
2
− w2m − w2n,
βm ≡ w0wm + wnwl,
γn ≡ w0wn − wlwm, (22)
and let Wlmn be the set of assistant unitary operators satisfying the equality αlβmγn = 0,
that is,
Wlmn = {W : αlβmγn = 0}. (23)
Theorem 4. Assume that an AQS scheme consists of the random rotation {R˜j}j∈{1,2,3} with
R˜j ∈ {σk : k ∈ Z4} and a quantum encryption {σkW}k∈Z4 with an assistant unitary operator
W . Then there exists at least one forgeable quantum message if and only if
W ∈ Wlmn (24)
for some distinct l, m, n ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
Proof. As in the proof of Lemma 3, without loss of generality, we may assume that R˜j = σj
for every j ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Suppose that W ∈ Wlmn for some distinct l, m, n ∈ {1, 2, 3}. We
may also assume that W ∈ W123, without loss of generality, that is, α1β2γ3 = 0. Note that
6
for any unitary W ,
σ†1W
†σ1Wσ1 ≃ σ†1W †σkσ1σkWσ1
≃

 −2β2 2α1 + 2iγ3
2α1 − 2iγ3 2β2

 ,
σ†2W
†σ1Wσ2 ≃ σ†2W †σkσ1σkWσ2
≃

 −2β2 −2α1 − 2iγ3
−2α1 + 2iγ3 2β2

 ,
σ†3W
†σ1Wσ3 ≃ σ†3W †σkσ1σkWσ3
≃

 2β2 −2α1 + 2iγ3
−2α1 − 2iγ3 −2β2

 (25)
for all k ∈ Z4. Therefore, it follows from Eqs. (25) that for each j ∈ {1, 2, 3} and k ∈ Z4,
the matrix
σ†jW
†σ1Wσj ≃ σ†jW †σkσ1σkWσj (26)
is one of at most two matrices up to global phase, since α1β2γ3 = 0. For example, if α1 = 0
then
σ†1W
†σ1Wσ1 ≃

 −2β2 2iγ3
−2iγ3 2β2

 ,
σ†2W
†σ1Wσ2 ≃

 −2β2 −2iγ3
2iγ3 2β2

 ≃

 2β2 2iγ3
−2iγ3 −2β2

 ≃ σ†3W †σ1Wσ3. (27)
Hence we can easily show that there exists a forgeable quantum message, as in the proof of
Theorem 1.
We now suppose that there exists a forgeable quantum message. For a given assistant
unitary operator W , there exist a quantum message |M0〉, a non-identity unitary Q =
q0σ0 + iq1σ1 − iq2σ2 + iq3σ3 and a unitary U such that
σ†jW
†σ†kQσkWσj|M0〉 ≃ U |M0〉 (28)
for all j ∈ {1, 2, 3} and k ∈ Z4. Then it follows from Lemma 3 that ql = ql′ = 0 for some
distinct l, l′ ∈ Z4. Then we have either Q = q0σ0 + i(−1)t−1qtσt or Q = i(−1)t−1qtσt +
i(−1)s−1qsσs for distinct t and s in {1, 2, 3}.
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If Q = q0σ0 + i(−1)t−1qtσt then we can obtain from tedious but straightforward calcula-
tions that αjβkγl = 0 for distinct j, k, l ∈ {1, 2, 3}. For example, if Q = q0σ0 + iq1σ1 then,
as in the proof of Lemma 3, the two 2× 2 matrices
σ1W
†σ0Q
†σ0Wσ1σ2W
†σ0Qσ0Wσ2 = σ1W
†Q†Wσ1σ2W
†QWσ2,
σ1W
†σ0Q
†σ0Wσ1σ3W
†σ0Qσ0Wσ3 = σ1W
†Q†Wσ1σ3W
†QWσ3 (29)
have a common eigenvector, that is, the two matrices

 q0 − 2iq1β2 −2q1iγ3 + 2iq1α1
2q1γ3 + 2iq1α1 q0 + 2iq1β2


†
 q0 − 2iq1β2 2q1γ3 − 2iq1α1
−2q1γ3 − 2iq1α1 q0 + 2iq1β2

 ,

 q0 − 2iq1β2 −2q1iγ3 + 2iq1α1
2q1γ3 + 2iq1α1 q0 + 2iq1β2


†
 q0 + 2iq1β2 −2q1γ3 − 2iq1α1
2q1γ3 − 2iq1α1 q0 − 2iq1β2

 (30)
have a common eigenvector. It follows from Proposition 2 and tedious calculations that
α1β2γ3 = 0, that is, W ∈ W123.
If Q = i(−1)t−1qtσt + i(−1)s−1qsσs then in the same way as above, we can show that
α3β2γ1 = 0. In particular, if Q = iq1σ1 − iq2σ2 then it can be obtained that α3 = 0 or
β22 + γ
2
1 = 0. Therefore, we conclude that W ∈ W321.
Theorem 4 provides us with a perfect characterization of the AQS schemes with forge-
able quantum messages which we have dealt with in this paper. For example, if an as-
sistant unitary operator in an AQS scheme is H = (σ0 + iσ1 − iσ2 + iσ3) /2 in [10] or
Wa ≃
(
iσ1 − iσ2 + i
√
2σ3
)
/2 in [15, 16], then α1 = 0 or α3 = 0, respectively, and hence
H ∈ W123 and Wa ∈ W312. Therefore we can clearly obtain from Theorem 4 that an AQS
scheme which uses H or Wa as an assistant unitary operator has at least one forgeable
quantum message.
In Ref. [16], the AQS scheme with three or more random rotation operators and an
assistant unitary operator
T =
iσ1 − iσ2 + iσ3√
3
(31)
was considered as a good candidate for the AQS scheme without forgeable quantum mes-
sages, and it was numerically shown that the AQS scheme does not generate any forge-
able quantum message, but any analytical proof has not yet been obtained. However, it
is readily shown that T /∈ Wlmn for any distinct l, m, n ∈ {1, 2, 3}, and furthermore
8
(σ0 + (−1)t−1iσt + (−1)s−1iσs)/
√
3 /∈ Wlmn for any distinct t, s ∈ {1, 2, 3} and any distinct
l, m, n ∈ {1, 2, 3}. It follows that we can use Theorem 4 to simply prove the following
corollary.
Corollary 5. There exists an AQS scheme without any forgeable quantum message.
We remark that the set
W = {W :W /∈ Wlmn for all {l, m, n} = {1, 2, 3}} (32)
is an infinite set, and hence there exist infinitely many AQS schemes with no forgeable
quantum message.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have dealt with a recently proposed concept, forgeable quantum mes-
sages, in the AQS schemes, and have proved that there exists a forgeable quantum message
in every AQS scheme with two quantum random rotations. Furthermore, we have presented
a necessary and sufficient condition for an AQS scheme with four quantum encryption opera-
tors and three or more quantum random rotations in which there exists a forgeable quantum
message. In other words, we have perfectly characterized assistant unitary operators in the
quantum encryption operators which produce at least one forgeable quantum message. In
the sequel, we have analytically shown that there exists an AQS scheme without any forge-
able quantum messages, by exploiting the necessary and sufficient condition.
In addition to the forgery problem, the AQS schemes may have other security problems
which we have not considered in this paper, but should consider in order to obtain a prac-
tically useful quantum signature scheme to sign quantum messages. Nonetheless, our work
provides a perfect characterization of the AQS schemes yielding forgeable quantum mes-
sages, although we have taken into account the specific AQS schemes. Therefore, it could
be helpful to conduct further research works related to the AQS, and could be also useful
to improve quantum cryptographic theories.
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